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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
John Henry Gill appeals from the Idaho Supreme Court's order denying 
his motion to augment the record with the transcript of the Rule 35 hearing. He 
also appeals from the district court's order granting his Rule 35 motion. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
Gill was convicted of Possession of Sexually Exploitative Material and he 
was required to register as a sex offender based on that conviction. (PSI, pp.85-
88, 181-821; 2/3/11 Tr., p.19, Ls.9-11.) While Gill was on probation, Gill violated 
the terms of his probation by registering and living at an address that was less 
than 3/10 of a mile from a licensed day care. (PSI, p.46.) Gill's probation officer 
instructed Gill to register and reside at the Boise Rescue Mission until an 
appropriate residence could be secured. (PSI, p.46; 8/26/10 Tr., p.4, L.16 - p.5, 
L.2.) Gill stayed at the Boise Rescue Mission for three days before he left 
without informing his probation officer. (PSI, p.46; 8/26/10 Tr., p.5, Ls.6-9.) Gill's 
probation officer did not have any contact with Gill after that. (PSI, p.46; 8/26/10 
Tr., p.5, Ls.10-18.) 
Approximately seven months later, Gill was indicted on federal charges in 
Utah for False Statements and Representations, Aggravated Identity Theft, 
Social Security Number Misuse and violating the Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Act. (PSI, pp.46, 103-06, 110.) Those charges were dismissed and 
1PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file 
"Gil!PSl.pdf." 
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Gill was extradited to Idaho. (PSI, p.46.) The state charged Gill with Failure to 
Register as a Sex Offender and sought a persistent violator sentencing 
enhancement based on Gill's prior felony convictions for two counts of Battery on 
a Law Enforcement Officer and one count of Possession of Sexually Exploitative 
Material. (R., pp.69-70, 143-44.) 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Gill entered an Alford plea to the Failure to 
Register as a Sex Offender charge. (R., pp.149-55; 2/3/11 Tr., p.1, Ls.10-20; 
p.20, L.23 - p.21, L.3.) Gill admitted that he had three prior felony convictions 
and pied guilty to the persistent violator enhancement. (2/3/11 Tr., p.13, L.21 -
p.14, L.2.) Prior to the sentencing hearing, the district court gave Gill three days 
to review the PSI and to respond to the information contained in the PSI. (R., 
pp.158-59; 4/18/11 Tr., p.32, Ls.18-22; 5/5/11 Tr., p.7, Ls.7-18.) Gill submitted 
two letters and a list of 40 PSI "amendments" to the district court. (PSI, pp.35-
41.) The district court ordered that the PSI include the documents Gill submitted. 
(PSI, p.34; 4/18/11 Tr., p.32, L.22 - p.33, L.22.) Thereafter, the district court 
imposed a unified sentence of 20 years with ten years fixed. (R., p.162-63; 
4/18/11 Tr., p.63, L.25 - p.64, L.2.) 
Gill then filed a Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence. (R., p.171.) At 
a hearing on Gill's Motion for Disqualification of Public Defender Including the 
Entire Public Defender's Office, Gill requested more time to amend the PSI 
because he had "about 100 more" amendments he wanted to make. (5/5/11 Tr., 
p.6, L.14 - p.7, L.2.) The district court gave Gill the opportunity to "write out all 
the additional information" he wanted the district court to consider in ruling on his 
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35 motion and set the matter for a hearing. (5/5/11 Tr., p.9, L.18 - p.10, L.3; 
p.16, Ls.11-13.) Gill requested an additional two weeks to review the PSI and to 
submit more amendments. (5/5/11 Tr., p.21, Ls.11-23.) The district court denied 
the request, but gave Gill five weeks to submit additional information in writing 
and allowed Gill to review the PSI for an additional day before the Rule 35 
hearing. (5/5/11 Tr., p.22, Ls.14-16; p.25, Ls.23-25.) 
Gill submitted an affidavit and several other documents in support of his 
Rule 35 motion. (Affidavit of John H. Gill in Support of Motion to Reconsider ICR 
35 (augmentation).) After the hearing on Gill's Rule 35 Motion, the district court 
entered an Order Granting Motion to Reduce Sentence and reduced the fixed 
portion of Gill's sentence from ten years to five years. (Order Granting Motion to 
Reduce Sentence (augmentation).) Gill timely appealed from the judgment and 
the district court's order reducing his sentence. (R., p.166-68.) 
On appeal, Gill filed a motion to augment the record with the Rule 35 
hearing transcript. (Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule, 
filed August 8, 2011.) The Idaho Supreme Court denied the motion with regard 
to the transcript of the Rule 35 hearing because it appeared that "no evidence 
was produced at the hearing." (Order Augmenting the Record, dated September 
9, 2011.) Gill filed a renewed motion to augment the record with the Rule 35 
hearing transcript because it appeared from the court minutes that "Gill was 
actively engaged in dialogue with the district court during the Rule 35 hearing." 
(Renewed Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule, filed 
October 6, 2011.) The Idaho Supreme Court denied that motion as well. (Order 
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Denying Renewed Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule, 
dated October 28, 2011.) 
4 
ISSUES 
Gill states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Gill due process and 
equal protection when it denied his Motion to Augment with the 
transcript of the Rule 35 hearing? 
2. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it partially 
denied Mr. Gill's Criminal Rule 35 Motion for a Reduction of 
Sentence? 
(Appellant's brief, p.3.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Does Gill's claim that the Idaho Supreme Court violated his constitutional 
rights by denying his request to augment the record with a transcript of the Rule 
35 hearing fail because he has not shown that the requested transcript is 
necessary for review of any issue presented on appeal? 
2. Has Gill failed to carry his burden of establishing that the district court 
abused its sentencing discretion when it reduced the fixed portion of his sentence 




Gill Has Failed To Demonstrate That The Idaho State Supreme Court Violated 
His Constitutional Rights By Denying His Motion To Augment 
A. Introduction 
Gill asserts that the Idaho Supreme Court violated his constitutional rights 
by denying his motion to augment the record in this case with the transcript of the 
Rule 35 hearing. (Appellant's brief, pp.4-14.) However, Gill has made no 
showing that the transcript is a necessary part of the record on appeal. The 
documentary evidence Gill submitted in support of his Rule 35 motion is already 
in the appellate record. (Affidavit of John H. Gill in Support of Motion to 
Reconsider ICR 35 (augmentation).) Furthermore, Gill concedes that he did not 
present any testimonial evidence at the Rule 35 hearing. (Appellant's brief, 
pp.14.) As such, Gill's constitutional claim is without merit because it is directly 
contrary to controlling Idaho Supreme Court precedent. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues such 
as claimed due process violations is one of deference to factual findings, unless 
they are clearly erroneous, but free review of whether constitutional requirements 
have been satisfied in light of the facts found. State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 
380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 720, 23 
P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001). 
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C. Gill Has Failed To Show Any Constitutional Entitlement To The Requested 
Augmentation 
A defendant in a criminal case has a right to "a record on appeal that is 
sufficient for adequate appellate review of the errors alleged regarding the 
proceedings below." State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 462, 50 P.3d 472, 477 
(2002) (citing Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Lane v. Brown, 372 
U.S. 477 (1963); Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. Of Prison Terms and Paroles, 
357 U.S. 214 (1958); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)). The state, however, 
"will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily" to provide transcripts or 
other items that "will not be germane to consideration of the appeal." Draper, 
372 U.S. at 495; see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 112 n.5 (1996) ("an 
indigent defendant is entitled only to those parts of the trial record that are 
germane to consideration of the appeal" (internal citations omitted)); Lane, 372 
U.S. 477; Griffin, 351 U.S. 12. To demonstrate that the record is not sufficient, 
the defendant must show that any omissions from the record prejudiced his 
ability to pursue the appeal. State v. Polson, 92 Idaho 615, 620-21, 448 P .2d 
229, 234-35 (1968) (distinguishing Martinez v. State, 92 Idaho 148, 438 P.2d 893 
(1968)). See United States v. Smith, 292 F.3d 90, 96-97 (1st Cir. 2002). To 
show prejudice Gill "must present something more than gross speculation that 
the transcripts were requisite to a fair appeal." Scott v. Ela, 302 F .3d 598, 605 
(6th Cir. 2002). 
This case is indistinguishable from State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 50 
P.3d 472 (2002). In that case the Idaho Supreme Court stated the relevant legal 
standards and concluded that the transcript of a Rule 35 hearing in which there 
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were no witnesses called was not necessary to conduct an adequate appellate 
review. kt at 462-63, 50 P.3d at 477-78. "When a motion to reduce sentence is 
supported solely by documentary evidence and no hearing is held, the denial of 
that motion can be adequately reviewed on appeal based on the evidence in the 
record." kt at 463, 50 P.3d at 478. "Likewise, when a hearing is held but only 
documentary evidence is offered, the denial of the motion to reduce sentence 
can be adequately reviewed on appeal without a stenographic transcript of the 
hearing." kt, 50 P.3d at 478 (emphasis added). The key to the Court's holding 
in Strand was that "neither the Defendant nor the State offered any testimony 
during the [Rule 35] hearing" and all of the documents offered into evidence were 
"made part of the record on appeal." kt at 462-63, 50 P.3d at 477-78. 
Here, the appellate record is adequate because, as in Strand, it contains 
all of the evidence submitted in support of the Rule 35 motion. All of the 
documentary evidence Gill submitted in support of his Rule 35 motion is already 
in the record on appeal. (Affidavit of John H. Gill in Support of Motion to 
Reconsider ICR 35 (augmentation).) Furthermore, Gill concedes that there was 
no testimonial evidence presented at the Rule 35 hearing. (Appellant's brief, 
p.14.) This record is more than sufficient for adequate appellate review of the 
district court's ruling on Gill's Rule 35 motion. Any comments that were made at 
the Rule 35 hearing by either the district court or Gill do not constitute "evidence" 
that would be necessary for determining whether the district court abused its 
discretion in reducing the fixed portion of Gill's sentence by five years. 
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Gill argues that because the district court "engaged in dialogue" with Gill at 
the Rule 35 hearing he is automatically entitled to the requested transcript so that 
he can address any "issues which arise" after reviewing the transcript. 
(Appellant's brief, p.14.) However, it is Gill's appellate burden of establishing that 
the requested transcript is necessary to create an adequate appellate record to 
review the district court's ruling on his Rule 35 motion. Gill simply assumes that 
the district court's decision was based on "Gill's comments on his own behalf at 
the Rule 35 hearing." (Appellant's brief, p.4.) Gill's assumption that comments 
made at the Rule 35 hearing might raise an issue on appeal is insu·fficient to 
meet his burden of demonstrating that a transcript of the Rule 35 hearing is 
necessary to complete an adequate record for appellate review. This is 
especially true in light of the fact that "[a] defendant does not even have the right 
to a hearing on a motion for reduction of sentence" and the district court was not 
"required to enter findings to support its" ruling on Gill's Rule 35 motion. Strand, 
137 Idaho at 463, 50 P.3d at 478. 
Gill cites to several cases where criminal defendants were denied 
appellate records because of their indigence to support his claim that he is 
entitled to the Rule 35 hearing transcript. ~. Draper v. Washington, 372 
U.S. 487 (1963); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963). However, there is nothing 
in the record that in any way indicates that Gill was denied a transcript solely 
because he is indigent. In fact, Gill's motion would have properly been denied 
even if he had the funds to pay for the transcripts. The Idaho Supreme Court's 
order properly denied the motion to augment because Gill failed to make a 
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showing that any appellant - indigent or otherwise - would be entitled to 
augment the record as requested. 
The Idaho Appellate Rules require any party seeking augmentation to set 
forth a ground sufficient to justify the augmentation requested. I.AR. 30. Gill's 
motion to augment failed because he did not meet this minimal burden, imposed 
upon all parties, of showing that the transcript is necessary or even helpful in 
addressing appellate issues. There is no reason to believe that the motion to 
augment would have been granted had Gill been paying for the requested 
transcript - the rule applies to all parties, not just the indigent. 
Gill has failed to show that the denial of his motion to augment was in any 
way influenced by his indigence. Gill has failed to show his due process rights 
were implicated, much less violated by the denial of his motion to augment. 
Furthermore, Gill has failed to show that the requested transcript is necessary to 
complete a record adequate to review any issue on appeal. The record amply 
demonstrates that Gill's motion to augment was properly denied because he has 
failed to show that the transcript of the Rule 35 hearing is necessary for adequate 
review of any issue properly before the Court. Because Gill has failed to 
demonstrate that the transcripts are necessary to his appeal, he is not entitled to 
relief. 
11. 
Gill Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By 
Not Reducing His Sentence Further 
A. Introduction 
Gill asserts that the district court abused its discretion by only reducing the 
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fixed portion of his sentence. (Appellant's brief, pp.14-17.) Gill contends that his 
unified sentence should be reduced from 20 years with five years fixed to seven 
years with five years fixed. (Appellant's brief, p.17.) Gill has failed to establish 
an abuse of discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a motion for reduction of 
sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and the Court reviews the denial 
of the motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 
159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). To prevail on appeal, Gill must "show that the 
sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently 
provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion." & 
C. Gill Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Erred When It 
Reduced The Fixed Portion Of His Sentence By Five Years 
Gill has failed to satisfy his burden of showing that the district court 
abused its discretion in light of the information provided in support of his Rule 35 
motion. At the sentencing hearing, the district court was concerned about Gill's 
criminal history. (4/18/11 Tr., p.62, Ls.15-22.) In 2002, Gill was convicted of 
Possession of Sexually Exploitative Material after he printed numerous 
photographs of sex acts between adults and children off of the internet. (PSI, 
pp.49-50, 85-88.2) The photographs contained images of toddlers and 
prepubescent children. (PSI, p.49.) Gill claimed that the images were "art" and 
that he only downloaded the images for his "research." (PSI, p.49.) While Gill 
2 Gill also had a number of other disturbing sexual behaviors involving minors 
prior to committing that offense. (PSI, p.50.) 
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was incarcerated for that crime, other inmates reported that Gill was "constantly 
watching [T.V.] shows with children such as Barney, Brady Bunch and the Olsen 
twins." (PSI, pp.51, 107.) A search of Gill's jail cell produced six pages of child 
pornography and the jail intercepted incoming mail for Gill that contained 
pornographic magazines such as "Barely Legal," as well as other pornographic 
magazines, videos and CDs. (PSI, pp.51, 107.) 
In 2003, Gill approached a woman at a Wal-Mart store from behind and 
began "touching her, and telling her how beautiful her little daughter was." (PSI, 
pp.84, 272.) Gill approached another woman in the store a short time later and 
threatened to fight her husband because the woman did not let Gill into her place 
of business earlier that evening. (PSI, p.79.) The business that the woman 
worked at was closed, but Gill tried to force his way in as the woman was 
leaving. (PSI, p.79.) Gill had been following that woman for several days and 
she was "very fearful of him." (PSI, p.79.) 
Police officers responded to the Wal-Mart store and attempted to remove 
Gill from the premises because he was harassing customers and employees. 
(PSI, p.79.3) Gill did not comply with the police officers' requests and Gill 
violently attacked the officers. (PSI, pp.79-83.) Gill was eventually subdued after 
he was sprayed with pepper spray and two bystanders assisted the officers in 
3 A Wal-Mart employee also informed police that Gill previously demanded her 
assistance in selecting jewelry for a 12 or 13 year old girl. (PSI, pp.50-51 ). Gill 
said he wanted to send the jewelry to a girl in Shoshone County from Spokane, 
Washington so that nobody would know who the jewelry came from. (PSI, p.51.) 
The employee reported the incident because "she was afraid for the young girl" 
and "she believed that Gill did not have good intentions." (PSI, p.82.) 
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securing Gill's right arm so that he could be handcuffed. (PSI, pp.80-83.) Gill 
was convicted of trespassing and two counts of Battery on a Law Enforcement 
Officer. (PSI, pp.48, 74-76.) 
In 2006, Gill moved to Utah without updating his sex offender registry 
information or contacting his probation officer. (PSI, p.46.) While in Utah, Gill 
was indicted on federal charges in Utah for False Statements and 
Representations, Aggravated Identity Theft, Social Security Number Misuse and 
violating the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act. (PSI, pp.46, 103-06, 
110.) A search of Gill's residence at that time produced children's underwear 
and "pedophile toys." (PSI, p.53.) The federal charges were eventually 
dismissed and Gill was extradited to Idaho where he was convicted of the instant 
offenses. (PSI, p.46.) 
Gill is not only a sexual offender, but he is a violent offender as well. What 
makes this combination even more alarming is the fact that Gill has continually 
refused to take responsibility for any of the crimes that he has committed despite 
"overwhelming evidence" to the contrary. (PSI, p.69; 4/18/11 Tr., p.59, Ls.15-
25.) The district court appropriately considered the seriousness of Gill's offenses 
and his rehabilitative potential. (4/18/11 Tr., p.59, L.15 - p.60, L.12; p.62, L.9 -
p.63, L.15.) In addition, the district court considered two letters and a list of 40 
PSI "amendments" that Gill submitted prior to sentencing. 4 (PSI, pp.34-41; 
4/18/11 Tr., p.32, L.22 - p.33, L.22.) 
4 The district court gave Gill three days to review the PSI and add any information 
that he wanted the district court to consider prior to sentencing. (R., pp.158-59; 
4/18/11 Tr., p.32, Ls.18-22; 5/5/11 Tr., p.7, Ls.7-18.) 
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The district court thoroughly addressed Gill's mental health issues and 
noted its concern with the fact that Gill essentially assumed another identity in 
order to separate himself from the crimes he has committed. (4/18/11 Tr., p.61, 
L. 19 - p.63, L.15.) As stated by the district court: 
I don't have any choice but to send you to the penitentiary because 
in the penitentiary you could be medically managed. You can get 
psychiatric treatment and then maybe at some point that you may 
be able to prove yourself, to be able to accept the fact that you are 
John Gill and John Gill's the one who's committed these very 
terrible crimes and that you did this; that you do have this deviant 
interest in young children, and that you are [a] hostile and 
argumentative person and that you are a danger to society. 
(4/18/11 Tr., p.63, Ls.4-15.) 
The district court took into account the finding in the I.C. § 19-2524 mental 
health report that there was a "possibility" that Gill's "behavior could improve with 
medical management" and imposed a unified sentence of 20 years with 10 years 
fixed. (4/18/11 Tr., p.63, L.18 - p.64, L.2; PSI, p.323.) That sentence was very 
reasonable in light of Gill's criminal history and the danger that he presents to 
society. The district obviously gave considerable weight to the mitigating 
information presented to it because the district court allowed Gill to have an 
opportunity to get out of prison on parole if he applied himself to his 
rehabilitation.5 
After the sentencing hearing, Gill filed a Rule 35 Motion and the district 
court gave Gill yet another opportunity to review the PSI and "write out all the 
additional information" he wanted the district court to consider in ruling on his 
5 The state requested a sentence of 20 years fixed. (4/18/11 Tr., p.40, Ls.9-12.) 
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Rule 35 motion. (5/5/11 Tr., p.9, L.18 - p.10, L.3.) Gill submitted an affidavit and 
several other documents prior to the Rule 35 hearing, which are all part of the 
record on appeal. (Affidavit of John H. Gill in Support of Motion to Reconsider 
ICR 35 (augmentation).) The documents Gill submitted in support of his Rule 35 
motion contain little, if any, "new information" that would be relevant to the 
determination of his sentence. 6 (Affidavit of John H. Gill in Support of Motion to 
Reconsider ICR 35 (augmentation).) The original sentence imposed by the 
district court was reasonable and the district court showed Gill even more 
leniency by reducing the fixed portion of his sentence by five years. (Order 
Granting Motion to Reduce Sentence (augmentation).) 
Gill now argues that the district court should have reduced his sentence 
even further by reducing the indeterminate portion of his sentence from fifteen 
years to seven years based on his mental health issues, physical and mental 
abuse that he suffered as a child, and the affidavit that he submitted in support of 
his Rule 35 motion in which he "told the court that he would have better access to 
mental health treatment outside of prison." (Appellant's brief, pp.15-17.) 
Gill's argument is without merit because none of this information was 
"new" to the district court. Gill's mental health issues and his childhood 
6 Gill also submitted documentation regarding his post-sentencing efforts to enroll 
in rehabilitative programming in prison. (Affidavit of John H. Gill in Support of 
Motion to Reconsider ICR 35 (augmentation).) However, the district court made 
clear that it would not consider that type of information in ruling on Gill's Rule 35 
motion because "[a]s far as the programs you're doing out there, that's not going 
to get your sentence reduced, because I expect if you go out to the prison you're 
going to do programs, and you're going to do those programs well in order to 
earn parole." (5/5/10 Tr., p.19, Ls.1-6.) 
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background were already thoroughly documented in the LC. § 19-2524 mental 
health report and the PSI. (PS!, pp.54-56, 238, 275-76.) Furthermore, Gill's 
unsubstantiated assertion that he could be more effectively treated in the 
community than in prison adds nothing to the analysis. 
The only information contained in Gill's affidavit that could even be 
considered "new" is Gill's statement that he does not qualify for sex offender 
treatment in prison and that his other programming would not begin until six 
months prior to his first parole hearing. (Affidavit of John H. Gill in Support of 
Motion to Reconsider !CR 35, p.2 (augmentation).) This information may have 
been important in considering Gill's Rule 35 motion because the district court 
was clearly concerned about Gill's amenability to treatment and wanted to ensure 
that Gill received treatment for his mental health issues. (4/18/11 Tr., p. 63, Ls.4-
15.) Based on Gill's statements in his affidavit, reducing the fixed portion of Gill's 
sentence would make him eligible for parole earlier so that he could have access 
to the mental health treatment that he needs. While the district court was 
certainly not required to take Gill's statements at face value and reduce an 
already reasonable sentence, the district court exercised its discretion and 
reduced the fixed portion of Gill's sentence. (Order Granting Motion to Reduce 
Sentence (augmentation).) 
Gill has failed to show any abuse of discretion. The original sentence the 
district imposed was reasonable in light of Gill's criminal history, the danger he 
presents to society, and his "high risk of recidivism." (4/18/11 Tr., p.62, L.7 -
p.63, L.15.) The district court had already given significant weight to the 
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mitigating evidence and imposed a relatively short determinate period in order to 
give Gill an opportunity to get his mental health issues under control and 
demonstrate that he is no longer danger to society. The district court then 
exercised its discretion and significantly reduced the fixed portion of Gill's 
sentence. Gill has not demonstrated that he is entitled to any further reduction of 
his sentence. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the 
district court. 
DATED this 27th day of February 2012. 
Deputy Attorney General 
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